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THE FALSE NATURAL LAW: PROFESSOR
GOBLE'S STRAW MAN
To ALL WHO FOLLOW the trends here and abroad in legal philosophy, it has
become apparent that the tide which has run so strongly against natural law
theory for many decades, has now begun to turn. As the fatal emptiness in the
heart of positivism becomes more exposed with each fresh assault upon freedom
by evil ideologies and with every new example of antisocial individualism, the
natural law position wins more attention and regains more of its ancient prestige.'
For the natural law position, in the classical and Scholastic sense, is gradually
revealing itself for what it is-as a strong central defense point between two
extremes, seeking at once to secure for us proper individual freedoms and to
impose upon us proper social duties.2
Significant in this turn of the tide is the article of George W. Goble entitled
"Nature, Man and Law: The True Natural Law" (A.B.A.J., May 1955). Here,
in the reflection of one whose roots are in the watery sands of Holmesian skepti-
cism but whose gropings are towards a deeper metaphysical foundation for law,
is a perfect example of the reversing trend in legal philosophy. "Natural law,"
it now appears, is no longer a term of opprobrium signifying an obsolete mode
of thought:-the target has become a "false classical natural law" in contrast
to a "true natural law." Holmes is no longer defended as the champion debunker
of all ultimate values: rather he is extolled as the idealist and man of faith who
is too great to be strait-jacketed in any closed system of absolutes. Religious
purposes and the concept of the Will of God are no longer excluded as valid
sources of law-it is orthodoxy and authority, as such, which are excluded. Most
important, the underlying issue has shifted from the question, "Does natural
law exist?" to the deeper question, "Who is to tell us what it is?"
All this represents a real change in the current of jurisprudential opinion. And
it is a change for the better.
Professor Goble's thesis runs something like this. Our knowledge of the laws
governing the physical universe is tentative, groping, and tainted with the sub-
jectivism of the observer. Certainty and absolutes concerning them are illusory.
This is the more true with respect to the laws governing human nature where
there is involved the power of abstract thought, free will, and the question of
what ought to be. The laws governing the conduct of man are not certain, fixed
1. See for example LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1955) (the natural law as
the answer to the irresponsibility of self-government and excessive freedom); the series of
articles on Holmes' philosophy in the A.B.A.J. (the natural law vs. the totalitarian potentiali-
ties of some of Holmes' statements; the sympathetic consideration of natural law by such men
as Professor Fuller (Harvard Law School) and Professor Northrop (Yale Law School); and
the frequent symposiums and institutes on natural law (for example in 13 OHIo ST. L. J.
(1952) and at Notre Dame). See generally FwI.mmANN, LEGAL THEORY (1949), C. 10.
2. The writer develops this more fully in What Does Natural Law jurisprudence Offer?,
4 CATHOLIC U. L. REv. (1954) and in Natural Law Jurisprudence and the Cleavage of
Our Time, 39 GEo. L. J. 365 (1951). But the restatement of natural law that is developing
will be far more than a rehash of the past: it will be a natural law deepened and enriched
by its resistance to the onslaught of positivism.
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and universal but rather the constantly revised product of a long evolution
wherein experience demonstrates to man's consciousness what is good and what
is bad. Consequently the classical natural law theory which asserts that there
exists for all eternity an ideal body of perfect and complete rules, demonstrated
by reason or revelation, valid for all places and all men-is clearly untenable.
There is no way of infallibly determining such supposedly ideal laws since men
disagree; and all that such laws really represent is the articulation, in the language
of absolutes, of the special preferences and customs of some particular person or
group. In effect these "natural laws" are merely arbitrary orthodoxies which
lead to the suppression of freedom and ultimately to inquisitions, gas chambers,
salt mines, the protection of vested interests, segregation, child labor and the like.
The only true natural law is the law of the endless diversity in human tastes and
capacities. Under this "natural law," we should humbly tolerate, and even
encourage, human diversity and scrupulously avoid imposing any fixed pattern
on society. Out of the consequent strife and competition will grow truth, peace,
civilization, the master plan of God and a "mystic spiritual tone that gives mean-
ing to the whole." We are progressing gradually to truth and to right by the
evolutionary process of accumulating wisdom on the basis of our diverse experi-
ences as to what is true, good, useful and needful. In the long run, the "good"
rule, like the truth, will be known by its persuasiveness to mankind as a whole.
To a supporter of natural law theory, understood in the traditional sense,
there are many questionable aspects of this interesting thesis. We may lay aside
the totally inadequate and unfair description of "classical natural law theory."3
We may also pass over the illogical argument that uncertainty with respect to
the laws of physical causation is tantamount to uncertainty with respect to the
laws in the realm of purpose and value. 4 We may even overlook the fact that
all of the Professor's major examples of the horrible tyrannies which allegedly
result from belief in absolute truths involved, not natural law absolutes as he
seems to imply, but values which had nonnatural law origins, i.e., Communism,
Nazism, and various revealed religions.
To be sure, these defects in Professor Goble's argument are real and notable.
But what arrests one's attention even more is the capacity of the Professor to
face in all directions at once. Like St. Paul, he is all things to all people. One
wonders that so many seemingly incompatible things can be held together in
one philosophy. How can we be so uncertain of our ends yet so certain of our
progress? How can absolute truth be so illusory yet the existence of God and a
"master plan" so believable? How can all values be relative to the individual and
S. Professor Goble in his one-paragraph summary, gives no idea of the richness, subtlety,
and depth of the classical tradition, stemming from Plato and Aristotle and coming on down
through the Stoics, Cicero, Augustine, Aquinas, Bracton, Coke, Suarez, Grotius, and dozens
of others. One would think these thinkers never grasped the difficulties or offered proof, but
simply built up an artificial code out of air. See CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PiTO
TO HEGoL. (1949) (chapters on Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Aquinas). Pound is no source
for a discriminating approach to natural law.
4. As if it is as hard to know when a man is good as it is to know who or what made him.
The distinction between efficient and final causes (or between causality and volition) and
the different methods of approaching them are so well known in legal philosophy that Pro-
fessor Gobel's failure to note them is remarkable. See IzRrN0, DER ZwacK IM RECUT
(1877).
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still there ensues an accumulated general wisdom of good? Again, by what
alchemy is the allowance of unrestrained diversity of human activity to result
in peace and civilization? And how is this doctrinaire tolerance to be reconciled
with a forceful rejection of Communist slavery, Nazi butchery, or religious bigotry?
Supposing these to be answered, one wonders further why it is that the "good,
the useful and the needful" of Professor Goble are to be known by their per-
suasiveness to the experienced mind of man, yet the "good" of the classical
natural law cannot be discovered by "reason." And how, having undermined
any possible natural law structure by showing that all absolutes are illusory, is
the Professor able to limit the ensuing collapse to what he calls the "classical"
natural law theory? By what method does he manage to narrow down his
attack to a "classical" type of natural law and avoid destroying those natural law
theories which make absolutes of freedom,5 of human dignity, and of the simple
virtues and decencies commonly recognized in the ethical thought of Judaism,
Christianity, Islamism, Buddhism, and Confucianism? 6
One may well be puzzled that all these things can stand together in one
philosophical vision. But all comes clear when we inspect the bases of the cohesion
of his thought. At heart the Professor sees that most human judgments are of
a personal and tentative nature and that as between men of different tastes,
there is no known authoritative principle of selection among them; so that any
authoritarian requirements of conformity are alien to the natural freedom, growth
and variety of human desires. At the same time he discerns dimly, amid the
twists and turns of history and through the relativity of tastes, a gradual better-
ment of the world and the formation of a general consensus of what is good
and true.
On the first score, it is clear to him that the classical natural law system
which in his view merely freezes transitory and special tastes into the social struc-
ture is evil; whereas the natural law theory of inalienable natural rights is no
problem at all, being on the side of freedom and diversity.
On the second score, the Professor sees that this relativity of values is limited
by his very ideas of the good and of the true. Law, says the Professor, is what
experience teaches mankind to be "good, useful and needful"; and "truth" is a
supreme good toward which we struggle. These are perennial goals transcending
our tentative experiments and conclusions in search of them. In the light of these
ideas, the Professor ii able to perceive through all the wanton happenings of
history, the residual fact of a general human progress in gaining wisdom and
building a better world.
In other words, while he repudiates the absolute standards of classical natural
law as too restrictive of liberty, he adopts sufficiently broad absolute standards of
his own to permit him to measure a forward movement of mankind towards
5. For example the Jeffersonian variety expressed in the Declaration of Independence. The
doctrine of inalienable natural rights has had an army of supporters. See 11 ENCYC. Soc. ScI-
ENczs, Natural Rights; GranRm, PoLITIcAL Tnzoaxus OF TE MDLz AOa 81-82 (Maitland
transl.); BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 123-125.
6. For example the injunctions to honesty and kindness; the prohibitions of such common
torts and crimes as trespass, assault, murder, stealing, and rape; and the rule against break-
ing contracts. Are these not still valid absolutes, granted problems of definition and hair-
line cases?
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them while still allowing for the lack of principles of order among individual
values.
By this means, the Professor has extricated himself from the dilemma of a
goalless progress: man has the unparticularized goals whose essence are truth
and goodness: the path to them may be tortuous but it is at least onward. He
is also enabled to conceive a God, a master plan, and an accumulated wisdom,
while still holding to the uncertainty and relativity of our knowledge: there is
an ultimate truth and a God; it is our knowing that is subjective and weak, not
the thing to be known. Moreover, he is released from the consequences of
unrestrained variety and an unlimited tolerance: variety must be within the
ambit of the good and the true, and tolerance must not be of the evil and the
false. Finally he has justified himself in assigning to intelligence and experience
the role of determining what is good and true, while denying the classical natural
law assignment of this same role to the light of reason. The classical theory
attempted, in his eyes, to fix immutably and universally the detailed conclusions
of reason--but since these were supposedly perfect, complete and beyond revision,
they could only retard human progress in contrast to his open-ended system which
allows for gradual correction and discovery.
There is a double blind spot in the Professor's vision, which prevents him
from seeing the inner contradictions of his thesis. He is blind to what the tradi-
tional natural law theory is. And he is blind to his own metaphysics. By reason
of these blind spots, he fails. to perceive that he has adopted the natural law
benefits without sacrificing inconsistent nonnatural law features. In order to
retain his ideals, progress, and God, what the Professor has done is to distinguish
in his mind between our judgments of particular goods and truths (which are
changeable and relative in value) and the ideas of goodness and truth (which
have a constant and universal value and validity.) But he fails to see that insofar
as he has thereby solved his own problem of the relativity of values, he has
simply backed his way onto the ground of classical metaphysics and psychology
upon which was built the very natural law theory which he attacks.
According to that metaphysics and psychology, there exist such transcendental
attributes as the true and the good. "Good" is defined as that being which
perfects and completes a thing in the line of its own particular essence; it is that
which answers to a given character; it is what every living thing desires for itself
because of its suitability to its natural inclination; in sum, it is what the Professor
calls the good, the useful, and the needful. The good for man is what fits his
natural inclination. And this inclination is precisely toward goodness as such,
with freedom to select particular goods, like life, friends, truth and God, that
appear to lead to that general end. Further, man judges whether a particular
thing partakes of this general goodness by the power of the proposition to per-
suade him of its cogency; by his mental experience of its reasonableness; by the
light of his reason.
Thus the Professor's false conception of traditional natural law theory has
obscured from him the basis of his thought. He has thereby deprived himself
of the benefit of centuries of systematic development and philosophic experience
with the idea of goodness. Nevertheless, what he favors still represents, in its
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essence, the dominant idea of natural law theory that comes down from Plato
and Aristotle through Cicero, Augustine, and Aquinas to the Neo-Scholastics of
today. According to that theory,7 natural law is simply the system and order
of goodness as knowable to our reason; it is the logical extension and application
of the philosophic idea of good into the realm of law. Having as its prime precept
the rule that good should be sought and evil avoided, and as its end the common
good, it develops a social and legal order, binding man to seek goodness in
general, but leaving him free to choose among particular goods that fall within the
ambit of the general end. Its influence on the positive law of the State is limited
to the influence that a general directive has upon particular applications and
the influence that a general principle has in calling for a logical corollary.
The Professor may try to turn back from this unwitting consequence of his
philosophical progress by reverting to the doctrine of the uncertainty of all
knowledge and all values. But he must know that he cannot have it both ways.
Either he has a standard to measure the true and the good; or he does not. He
cannot have a measuring rod that is not a measuring rod. It would be convenient
to say as against the skeptics that there is an ideal truth and an ideal good which
serve as the basis for measuring progress towards them; and as against the natural
law thinkers that there is no such ideal to serve as a basis of measurement.
Reflection will show that the appearance of having achieved such a non-ruling
ruler is illusory. All that has really happened is that he has been taken in by
his own subtle disguise of the choice that he has made.
Brought to this point, the crux of the issue which such thinkers as Professor
Goble must face is whether or not the idea of "the good" has any definite meaning.
Is "the good" a completely equivocal and essentially empty word to be applied
as a subjective tag to our separate and variable personal judgments? Or is it
a definable ideal with an objective essence which remains ever the same under
varying applications?
If the former is the case, then Professor Goble has no right, in logic, to talk
about such things as progress, master plans, ultimate truth, grand strategy, the
City of God, building toward a higher destiny, and the like. We are simply
in a sea of relative and unstable subjective values with no logical basis of pre-
ferring one value to another, no principle of hierarchy or permanent validity
among goods.
On the other hand, if the latter is true-if "good" has some definite though
inclusive content-Professor Goble has no right in logic to attack the classical
natural law concept of the good.
Granted his courage to face the alternatives, which of the two will the Pro-
fessor choose? It is submitted that he must choose the latter, if he is to retain
his progress, his ideals, his hope, his God. And if that is so, then he cannot
attack the very classical natural law which he has thereby adopted. What he
can attack is a false idea of classical natural law. He can continue to attack
a natural law theory that purports to offer a detailed code, discoverable by reason,
that is to say, a perfect closed, unchangeable body of particular rules good for
7. For a general history and exposition of the natural law theory, see RomMEN, THE NAT-
URAL LAw (1947).
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all times, places, and persons. He can attack, as he does, any natural law theory
which shields tyranny, vested interests, slavery, segregation, and the like. He can
attack the warped nineteenth century natural law which put too much emphasis
on natural liberty and property rights and too little emphasis on natural duty
and social responsibility. He could also, if he would, legitimately attack a natural
law which asserts that the clergy of a church or the political elite of some society
are its authoritative spokesmen.
All this is to say Professor Goble can attack faulty applications of natural
law theory based upon bad internal logic or upon errors of fact. And these
attacks would be good because, when he finishes, he will have destroyed a straw
man. He will have demolished a false conception of the traditional theory, not
the traditional theory itself.
After all, the traditional theory does not attempt to set up a detailed code
good for all times, persons, and places. On the contrary, it lays down certain
broad general directives which remain the same while the detailed applications
vary as means to a fixed end may vary under the impact of changed circum-
stances and greater knowledge. There is as large a place in this system for trial
and error, experiment and gradual discovery of the right rule for particular cases
as ever there may be in Professor Goble's own program. This is made abundantly
clear in the Scholastic scheme.8
Nor does the classical and Scholastic natural law theory claim to be rightfully
interpreted only by some infallible or select elite. On the contrary it claims to
be known precisely by the light of our intellect, i.e., by the intellectual persuasive-
ness, the rationality, of the true and the good that the Professor extols. 9
Nor again can it be said that the traditional theory imposes too restrictive
a pattern on society or conversely that it espouses too broad a liberty in the field
of contract and property rights. On the contrary, historically it has been.both
an ample liberating influence and a wise restraining influence.
Was it not natural law theory that inspired the guarantee of inalienable rights
in our Constitution;10 that called kings and emperors to account to the rights
of the people; 1 1 and that moved our courts to override the constraints of arbitrary
8. See Rommen, op. eit. supra note 7, at 218-219; Aquinas, Summa Theol. I I1-, 94, 4.
9. For a discussion *of this issue, see GERHART, AMERICAN LrsERTY AND 'NATURAL LAW'
(1953), and the book review thereof by Constable in I CATHOLIC LAwYzR 143 (1955).
Under the Scholastic natural law theory, the light of reason, not the Church, determines what
natural law is. Aquinas, Summa Theol., I&a Ha, 91, 2; 94, 2. At the same time revelation
can confirm and supplement (but not contradict) the findings of reason.
10. See Manion, The Natural Law Philosophy of Founding Fathers, I NATURAL LAW
INSTITUTE PROCzEDINOs 3 (1949) illustrating the views of Hamilton, Wilson, Adams,
Dickinson, Otis, Jefferson, and others.
11. For example Coke in Calvin's Case, Trin. 6 Jac. 1, 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B. 1610);
see discussion and quotations by Wu, Natural Law and our Common Law, 23 FORDHAM L.
Rzv. 13 (1954). Note: COHEN, REASON AND LAw 134 (1950): "We are all generally
familiar with the history of Aristotelian and Stoic doctrine of natural law, how it was carried
into Roman Law and used to mitigate the rigor of slavery, how it became the intellectual
weapon of the people against the claims of popes and emperors, how in the hands of
Grotius it proved a powerful instrument for the mitigation of the barbarities of war, or in
the hands of American judges has become a powerful influence for the defense of property
against the claims of society or of the working claism" See also M~AINE. ANCIENT LAw
94-96. See note 5.
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legislation or action in the name of due process or judicial review? 1 2 Again, did
not natural law lay the foundations for international law;13 establish the principle
of reasonableness in our common law;14 and prompt our legislators and judges
to prescribe humane social responsibilities toward our less fortunate neighbors?' 5
It has been the fate of the traditional natural law position to be always
attacked from the two opposite political extremes: those who resist its social
responsibilities and those who connive against its grant of individual liberties;
and these things often in the very name of natural law. As against the moder-
ating social requirements of natural law, one extreme encourages the license of
exaggerated self-determination, particularly in economic matters. As against the
inalienable liberties of natural law, the other extreme invents the shackling
doctrine that all rights derive from the state as the final and sovereign authority,
or more simply, from effective commands.
It was not the traditional natural law theory that contained the errors and
dangers that worry Professor Goble. These sins are chargeable to others like
Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Rousseau, Austin, Bentham, Dewey, and Kelsen. In fact
they are chargeable to all who have helped to destroy the anchorage of law in
a transcendental ground of goodness and truth and God, an anchorage that
places liberties and duties beyond the pulling and hauling of merely human
interests and preferences. Notwithstanding all the loving defenses of the epi-
grammatic thought of Holmes, that witty and aristocratic jurist was guilty here.
Professor Goble is against, not the traditional natural law theory, but the
false image of that theory created by its overzealous friends and its uncompre-
hending enemies. He is against a false natural law. That is the real villain.
And it is time that this villain, based as it is on the historical accretions of mis-
interpretation and misapplication, be exposed for what it is. For these accretions
have overlaid the truth with a repellent coating of falsehood whereby men of
good will have been diverted from penetrating to the majestic truth that lies
beneath.
Let Professor Goble destroy this straw man set up by the cleverness of such
men as Holmes. He will have done a good work. For only thus can he, and
others like him, see the clear outlines of the true natural law upon which they
are secretly building.
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12. See Corwin, The Natural Law and the Constitutional Law, 3 NATURAL ]LAW INSTI-
TUTE PROCEEDINGS 47 (1949); and Dr. Bonham's Case, Hil. 7 Jac. 1, 77 Eng. Rep. 646
(K.B. 1610).
13. Grotius, in particular, in De lure ac Belli. See FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 32-34; and
MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 92-96 (1861).
14. See Pollock, The History of the Law of Nature, 1 COLUM. L. Rzv. 29-32 (1901); and
Wu, supra note 11.
15. For example the "natural" duties to support wife and children, to care for the sick and
the aged, to defend one's country, to help the poor--all of which have found frequent articu.
lation in case law and statutory law. To give a single random example: Weir v. Mosley,
125 S. W. 798 (Mo.).
